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We study contracting between a consumer and an expert in a credence goods model
when (i) the expert’s choice of diagnosis effort is not observable, (ii) the expert might
misrepresent his private information about the adequate treatment, and (iii) payments
can depend only on the consumer’s subjective evaluation of treatment success. We show
that the first–best solution can always be implemented if the parties’ discount factor is
equal to one; a decrease in the discount factor makes obtaining the first–best more
difficult. The first–best is also always implementable if separation of diagnosis and
treatment is possible.
This paper analyses the optimal design of contracts between a consumer and an expert in a
credence goods environment, where the consumer relies on the expert’s private information
in order to choose one of two services (or treatments). There are three incentive problems:
First, there is a moral hazard problem because the expert’s diagnostic effort is not observable.
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Therefore, the contract should induce the expert to invest in costly information acquisition.
Second, only the expert knows the diagnosis information and so the contract has to provide
the expert with incentives for truthful reporting. Third, there is a problem of subjective eval-
uation. As success and failure are only observed by the consumer and not publicly verified,
payments for treatments can only rely on the consumer’s subjective evaluation, which might
be misrepresented. Large parts of the credence goods literature focus on problem of truthful
reporting by the expert in the absence of the moral hazard problem of diagnosis effort and
the problem of subjective evaluation by the consumer. We provide conditions under which
the first–best can be reached in the presence of these two additional incentive problems.
We show that this is possible if the parties’ discount factor is close enough to one so that the
consumer does not care too much about a delay in the solution of the problem. Interestingly,
independently of the discount factor, the first–best can always be obtained if it is possible to
separate diagnosis and treatment by employing different experts for each task.
The environment considered is the by now standard credence good problem.1 In such
a situation there is an important information asymmetry between the consumer and the
expert. Even if the consumer can determine which service he received, he does not know
whether he really needed an expensive high quality service or whether a less costly ser-
vice of lower quality would have been sufficient. Consequently, incentives for opportunistic
behaviour arise, because a self-interested expert who also provides the service might give
inappropriate advice and remain undetected. Two types of inefficiencies can appear. On one
hand, the quality of the treatment can be too low and not solve the consumer’s problem;
we refer to this as undertreatment. On the other hand, overtreatment might occur, because
when only low quality is needed, high quality is not valued higher than low quality.
These inefficiencies have potentially important implications. As many other countries,
over recent years the U.S. experienced large increases in health care spending that many
1The concept of credence goods was introduced by Darby and Karni (1973). Unlike experience goods,
a credence good has important properties that the consumer cannot detect even after consumption and the
consumer relies on the advice of the seller. Classical examples include medical and legal advice, a variety
of repair services, real estate services or taxi services. More recent applications of the concept of credence
goods include technologically advanced consumption goods with many options (Dulleck and Kerschbamer,
2009), the newspaper industry (Gabszewicz and Resende, 2012), auditing services (Causholli et al., 2013;
Knechel 2013), financial services (Brown and Minor, 2012), contracting for infrastructure projects (Dulleck et
al., 2015), and fiscal restraints in public finance (Dulleck and Wigger, 2015).
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think are unsustainable. Dr. Donald M. Berwick, a former administrator of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, listed overtreatment as one of the key reasons for ‘waste’
in health care, saying that: ‘Much is done that does not help patients at all, and many
physicians know it’.2 In fact, in Berwick and Hackbarth (2012, p. 1514) he writes that
overtreatment is ‘the waste that comes from subjecting patients to care that, according to
sound science and the patients’ own preferences, cannot possibly help them—care rooted
in outmoded habits, supply-driven behaviors, and ignoring science. Examples include ex-
cessive use of antibiotics, use of surgery when watchful waiting is better, and unwanted
intensive care at the end of life for patients who prefer hospice and home care. We estimate
that this category represented between $ 158 billion and $ 226 billion in wasteful spending
in 2011’.3
It is well known that in the credence good problem the first–best can be reached, pro-
vided the expert can determine the consumer’s type of problem without incurring any cost
to himself (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). In order to do so the contract has to establish
equal markup payments, which make the expert indifferent between treatments. Unequal
markups would bias the expert towards one alternative, precluding truthful reporting. We
depart from this credence good setting in three ways.
First, we depart from much of the credence goods literature by endowing the expert
with a potentially less efficient diagnosis technology. First of all, we suppose that becoming
informed before choosing a treatment requires exerting costly diagnosis effort. This creates
a moral hazard problem because whether effort has been exerted is not observable. As a
result, equal markup contracts no longer provide effort incentives. The reason is that the
expert gains the markup if he chooses based on prior information, while this markup is
reduced by the effort cost when he exerts diagnostic effort. Moreover, we allow the expert’s
2See e.g. Robert Pear, ‘Health Official Takes Parting Shot at Waste’, The New York Times 3, December 2011.
For a discussion of the conceptual difficulties in identifying wasteful health care spending see Fuchs (2009).
The ABIM Foundation (established by the American Board of Internal Medicine, an organization certifying
physicians specializing in internal medicine) has started the initiative Choosing Wisely that aims to reduce
overuse of tests and procedures, see www.choosingwisely.org, accessed on 26/10/2016.
3Kale et al. (2011) look at that the top 5 overused clinical activities across 3 primary care specialties
(pediatrics, internal medicine, and family medicine) and report that these activities are common in primary
care although they provide little benefit to patients. They conclude that the associated costs of these activities
exceed $ 5 billion.
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signal to be noisy. Under- and overtreatment might thus occur, even if the expert invests in
information and reports it truthfully, as his signal is not always correct.
Second, we follow Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) and consider sequential treatments.
In addition, we allow for delay costs. Usually, the game ends when the consumer experiences
undertreatment. In reality, however, the interaction between the consumer and the expert is
unlikely to end if the consumer’s problem is not solved. A patient, for instance, whose health
problem persists after a non-invasive intervention (say knee injections) might well revisit the
expert and ask for a surgical procedure. We assume that after the low-cost treatment failed,
the consumer’s problem may be solved by applying the high-cost treatment in a second
period. Undertreatment causes therefore two types of costs. On one hand, the first period
low–cost treatment is wasteful, and, on the other, it delays the solution of the consumer’s
problem. We measure this delay cost by 1 − δ, where δ is the parties’ common discount
factor. When the discount factor is close to zero, undertreatment involves substantial delay
cost, and in the extreme δ = 0 we recover the standard setting considered in the survey
by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006). The other extreme is reached for δ = 1, so that
undertreatment involves no delay cost at all.4
Third, we connect the credence good problem to the literature on contracting with sub-
jective evaluation. As already mentioned, we assume that treatment choices are verifiable
and contractible. This assumption is likely to hold when the consumer needs no specific
expertise to identify treatments, as in the aforementioned examples of knee injections and
surgical procedures (when informed consent must be given).5 In addition, we suppose that
4To the best of our knowledge only Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) consider a model of credence goods
and allow for sequential treatments. Liu and Ma (2013) provide a model of medical treatment decisions with
treatments potentially applied in sequence. Both papers consider only the extreme case in which the discount
factor is one. This precludes delay costs, which – as we will see – play an important role in our setting. There
are also credence goods models in which the expert is liable to solve the problem of the consumer; see Dulleck
and Kerschbamer (2006) for references. This is related to our model, because we assume that after failure of
the low-cost treatment the consumer can request the high-cost treatment from the expert. Following Hilger
(2016), who notes that liability can be defined as infinite punishment, our setting appears to be a weak form
of liability.
5Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006, p. 16) write that ‘The verifiability assumption is likely to be satisfied
in important credence goods markets, including dental services, automobile and equipment repair, and pest
control. For more sophisticated repairs, where the customer is usually not physically present during the treat-
ment, verifiability is often secured indirectly through the provision of ex post evidence. In the automobile
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- even though the consumer might be able to observe the outcome of treatment as private
information - it is impossible to verify treatment success in court.6 As already mentioned,
however, the interaction between the consumer and the expert is unlikely to end if the con-
sumer experiences undertreatment. We therefore assume that undertreatment can have
consequences for the expert. More precisely, we assume that payments for the low-cost
treatment can be made contingent on the consumer’s subjective report of the outcome, that
is, on whether he reports success or failure. Since this report might potentially be misrep-
resented, a problem of subjective evaluation arises.
We analyse whether the consumer can choose the payments for treatments in such a
way that delegating the choice of treatment to the expert avoids the two-sided incentive
problem.7 The motivation for this approach is the following. In our model treatments
are contractible. Following the Revelation Principle, the contracting problem can then be
stated as a direct mechanism design problem, where the consumer’s and the expert’s payoffs
are derived from the basic credence goods problem described in Dulleck and Kerschbamer
(2006, Table I, p. 11). Consequently, it is optimal to specify contract terms depending on
the expert’s reports, subject to the requirement that it must be incentive compatible for him
to reveal his information truthfully. Therefore, it is also optimal to delegate the choice of
treatment to the expert. A second feature implied by our approach is similar to Liu and Ma
(2013) in that contractual payments are specified over the entire diagnosis and treatment
relation. This specification allows the payment for the high-cost treatment in the second
period (after failure of the low-cost treatment) to differ from the payment for using high-
cost treatment directly in the first period.
It is not unrealistic that payments are specified over the entire diagnosis and treatment
repair market, for instance, it is quite common that broken parts are handed over to the customer to sub-
stantiate the claim that replacement, and not only repair, has been performed. Similarly, in the historic car
restoration market the type of treatment is usually documented step by step in pictures’. See also Dulleck and
Kerschbamer’s discussion on p. 31.
6This difficulty has been recognised in the literature. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006, p. 32) write that
‘. . . treatment success is often impossible or very costly to measure for a court, while still being observed by
the consumer (how can one prove the presence/absence of pain, for instance). In such a situation, a patient
may misreport treatment success . . . ’.
7There is evidence that financial incentives affect professional recommendations, including studies on
health services (Donaldson and Gerard, 1989; Henning-Schmidt et al., 2011; Clemens and Gottlieb, 2014)
and financial services (Brown and Minor, 2012; Mullainathan et al., 2012).
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relation. For example, Berenson et al. (2012, p. 1365) discuss hospital readmissions of
Medicare beneficiaries and propose to create ‘a single-episode price for all services associ-
ated with a surgical procedure, such as coronary-artery bypass grafting, including the initial
hospitalization and all related services for 90 days, including any rehospitalizations — in
essence, a warranty’ in order to improve care and reduce spending. They report that sim-
ilar programs are in place Britain, Germany and Maryland. Similarly, it is not unrealistic
that payments to healthcare providers might depend on performance measures including
patient satisfaction data that can be interpreted as subjective evaluation. Salisbury (2009)
discusses the quality and outcomes framework in the United Kingdom in which the pay of
general practitioners is partly based on performance, including patient experience.
Our main result highlights the importance of delay costs. If δ = 1 so that undertreatment
involves no delay cost, then the first–best is always implementable by a contract. If, however,
δ < 1, then the first–best is still implementable when effort costs are either high or low.
For situations with intermediate effort costs in combination with a relatively uninformative
prior, however, only a second–best outcome is implementable. The intuition for this result is
based on the interplay of the problems of moral hazard and subjective evaluation. On the one
hand, avoiding the former and endowing the expert with efficient information acquisition
incentives requires that his reward in the event of failure of the low–cost treatment should be
small enough in order to reflect delay cost. On the other hand, if payments after failure are
too low, then the consumer has no incentive to reveal the success of the low-cost treatment
truthfully and the latter problem cannot be avoided. Consequently, the conflict between
the requirements grows with delay costs and the requirements can only be reconciled when
these costs vanish.
We turn then to an extension of our model in which it is possible to separate diagno-
sis and treatment. This is a reasonable assumption in situations in which diagnosis and
treatment are to a large extent two independent procedures. For example, prescribing and
vending of drugs are independent activities and can therefore be carried out by different
agents (doctors and pharmacies). In other situations, however, such a separation is not
reasonable, as when treatment is more or less a by-product of diagnosis (like some surgical
procedures).8 We show that when separation is possible, then the first–best is always im-
8Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) provide further examples for situations in which separation is likely to
be feasible and when it is not. Emons (1997) relates the feasibility of separation to the existence of economies
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plementable. The intuition is that separate payments for diagnosis and treatment allow for
more flexibility to cope with the joint problems of diagnosis incentives and subjective evalua-
tion. The trade-off between both problems can be solved in the following way. In the event
of failure, the expert making the diagnosis can receive a small payment so that information
acquisition is induced, while the expert providing the treatment receives a large amount
so that total payments to both experts are high enough to give the consumer incentives for
truthful reporting.
Although our model is very stylised, it allows us to draw policy implications. In sit-
uations in which diagnosis and treatment are jointly provided, it recommends contracts
that resemble a prospective payment system and contributes hence to the discussion whether
a retrospective or a prospective payment system is optimal.9 Under a prospective system
payments have no link to the real costs of treatments, while under a retrospective system
reimbursement is based on real treatment costs. The standard argument in favour of a
prospective payment system is that a fixed budget contains health care costs, because it
breaks the link between the expert’s income and the number of treatments provided. Our
argument focuses on a moral hazard problem in providing diagnosis and is therefore differ-
ent. Our analysis also recommends that contractual payments should be based on treatment
protocols, rather than on each treatment in isolation. Payments for the low-cost treatment
should include a reimbursement for a potentially necessary high-cost treatment. This mim-
ics the so-called payments per case to both individual providers, like general practitioners, or
institutional providers, like hospitals.10 In addition, our model recommends equal markup
payments on treatment protocols that are based on the expected costs of a sequence of
of scope between diagnosis and treatment, while Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) propose a formalization
that is based on whether a recommendation identifies uniquely the service to be performed. Separation has
already been discussed by Darby and Karni (1973) as a solution to the problem of fraud by experts, because
an expert has only an incentive to recommend unnecessary treatment if he also provides it. As observed
by Wolinsky (1993, p. 387), ‘Such arrangements, however, would raise new problems regarding the proper
incentives for the diagnostician and hence might not be easily sustainable’. In our setting the expert must not
only be provided with incentives to give correct advice, but also to exert costly diagnostic effort in the first
place.
9Much of the following discussion is based on the definitions provided in Jegers et al. (2002).
10An important example for payments per case to institutional providers are Diagnostic Related Groups
Systems (DRG-system) for hospitals. This system has been used in the U.S. (Medicare), Canada, or Germany,
among others (Jegers et al., 2002). An example for payments per case to individual providers is a so-called
integrated system, like the British general practitioner fundholder system. Here primary care doctors might
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treatments. Prospective reimbursement systems with this feature are called cost-neutral.
Cost-neutrality is usually justified by a concern to avoid that patents receive the least costly
treatment option. Our argument is again different, since it recognises the existence of di-
agnosis costs and is based on a concern to provide incentives for information acquisition.
Taking all together, our model provides support for a prospective reimbursement payment
system in which reimbursement is per case and cost-neutral. This stands in stark contrast
to the standard credence good model which recommends a retrospective payment system
with equal markup payments for real treatment costs.
In some situations it is possible to separate diagnosis and treatment, because they are
two largely independent procedures. In these cases our analysis provides novel theoretical
support for separation, complementing existing explanations. For example, in their discus-
sions of separation between doctors and pharmacies, Darby and Karni (1973) and Dulleck
and Kerschbamer (2006, p. 8) focus on the incentive problem of revealing the diagnosis
outcome and argue that breaking up the joint provision of diagnosis and treatment avoids
overtreatment. In contrast, in our framework separation alleviates also moral hazard in
investing in diagnosis effort and the tension between this problem and the problem of sub-
jective evaluation.
Related Literature
The literature on credence goods focusses on the avoidance of fraud. Since the result of
diagnosis is unobserved, opportunistic advice might result in inappropriate treatment. We
follow a strand of the literature that assumes treatment decisions are observable. As men-
tioned earlier, fraud might then occur when treatments have different markups, as the expert
might misrepresent the required treatment.11 A second strand of literature assumes that the
treatment provided is not observable. This gives rise to a different type of fraud, in which
the low-cost treatment is provided but misrepresented as a high-cost one.12 In addition, a
social loss from the problem remaining insufficiently treated may arise.13
get a payment in advance and in return have to provide comprehensive health care that might require buying
hospital care or drugs when needed.
11See Darby and Karni (1973), Emons (1997, 2001), De Jaegher and Jegers (2001), Frankel and Schwarz
(2014), Fong et al. (2014), and Hilger (2016).
12See Darby and Karni (1973), Pitchik and Schotter (1987, 1993), Wolinsky (1993, 1995), Sülzle and
Wambach (2005), Alger and Salanié (2006), Hyndman and Ozerturk (2011).
13See Fong (2005), Liu (2011).
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These models assume that the expert is perfectly informed, without incurring any costs.
Consequently, they abstract from the moral hazard problem we consider.14 When such a
moral hazard problem is considered, equal markups no longer achieve the first–best and the
question how the credence good environment should be designed arises. The theoretical
literature considering this question is very small.15
Similar to us, Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) assume that success and failure of treat-
ment are unobservable and unverifiable, but they do not consider the problem of subjective
evaluation. In contrast to our model, in which treatments are vertically differentiated, in
their setting differentiation is horizontal so that the problem of overtreatment cannot appear.
In addition, treatments are equally costly and experts have no incentive to misrepresent the
required treatment, once it is diagnosed. This isolates the problem to provide incentives to
invest in costly diagnostic effort, when contrary to us the diagnostic signal is assumed to be
perfectly precise. Pesendorfer and Wolinsky explore how competition between experts can
allow consumers to obtain multiple diagnoses and whether this competition can provide
experts with effort incentives. Their main result is that the equilibrium is inefficient. In
contrast, we provide conditions under which the first–best can be reached. In an extension,
Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) also discuss briefly the case when it is possible to sepa-
rate diagnosis and treatment. Interestingly, they show that the outcome remains inefficient,
while our extension to such a setting shows that the first–best is always implementable. In
this sense, our result emphasises the potential of multiple experts to specialise in diagnosis
and treatment rather than to compete with one another, as in Pesendorfer and Wolinsky.16
14Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) review this literature in a unified model. Our model generalises their
setting in the three dimensions explained above. The limiting case of our model when (i) the expert’s signal is
costless as well as perfectly precise; (ii) treatments cannot be applied in sequence (that is, the discount factor δ
vanishes); and (iii) contractual payments are restricted to depend only on the choice of treatment, recovers the
setting in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) in which their assumptions H (Homogeneity), C (Commitment),
and V (Verifiability) hold and their Lemma 1 applies.
15Bonroy et al. (2013) also analyse a credence good problem and look at incentives for costly diagnostic
effort. The problem considered is different from ours, however, because effort is observable. The papers by
Demski and Sappington (1987), Taylor (1995), and Malcomson (2004) investigate costly diagnostic effort in
settings different from the credence goods environment with observable treatments that we consider.
16Notice that this specialization result is different from (vertical) specialization results in the second strand of
literature mentioned above, in which treatment decisions are unobservable. In Wolinsky (1993) or Alger and
Salanié (2006) some experts provide only the minor treatment, while others specialise in the major treatment.
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Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) investigate the incentives of experts to exert diagnostic
effort and to report truthfully when they face competition from chain stores or discounters.
Their analysis has thus a very different focus from ours. In their model, however, effort
is costly and treatments can be applied in sequence. There are three main modeling dif-
ferences. First, in their paper the expert’s signal is perfectly precise, whereas we allow for
noise. This generalization is not only realistic but also potentially important. Without noise
the low-cost treatment is less attractive to the expert, because when the treatment fails one
can infer that he did not exert diagnostic effort.17 Second, in Dulleck and Kerschbamer
(2009) success and failure of treatment are observable and verifiable. We will later explain
that under this assumption the first-best can always be obtained in our model, even though
diagnosis effort is not observable. Third, in their paper there are no delay costs and as a
byproduct Dulleck and Kerschbamer describe contracts that provide effort incentives. This
is consistent with our result that the first–best can be achieved when there are no delay
costs. Our analysis goes beyond their result and shows that when failure is not verifiable
and delay costs are introduced, a tension between the problems of moral hazard and sub-
jective evaluation arises, so that the first–best can no longer be achieved for some parameter
combinations.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on subjective evaluation, which addresses
the problem of providing of effort incentives for the agent in situations where only the prin-
cipal privately observes some performance measure. This applies to our context because
the expert has to invest effort in identifying the appropriate treatment, and only the con-
sumer learns the outcome of the treatment. Some part of the literature studies subjective
evaluations in models of repeated interactions, where intertemporal incentives play a key
role.18 Our model is more closely related to MacLeod (2003), who like us considers a single
interaction between a principal and an agent. He shows that effort incentives can be cre-
ated only if the contract specifies some ex post inefficiencies that are formally equivalent to
‘money burning’, i.e. payments to a passive third party. Such payments allow punishing the
agent for poor performance without distorting the principal’s truthful subjective evaluation.
In contrast, our analysis is confined to budget balanced contracts and excludes third-party
payments. Nonetheless, even under joint provision of diagnosis and treatment, the first–best
17Since the second treatment is observable, it becomes public that the expert has violated the contract by
not acquiring information.
18See e.g. Baker et al. (1994), Pearce and Stacchetti (1998), Levin (2003), Fuchs (2007).
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can be achieved at least for some range of parameter combinations. A main driver for this
efficiency result is that the expert can be punished for failure by contractually obliging him
to provide the high–cost service if the consumer reports failure of the low–cost service. The
consumer, however, does not benefit from this punishment if his problem has been solved
already by the low–cost treatment, because after a successful treatment he does not gain in
utility from an additional treatment. These two properties of our model eliminate the ten-
sion between the consumer’s truth-telling constraint and the expert’s incentive constraint
for δ = 1, and soften it for 0 < δ < 1. Under separation of diagnosis and treatment the
first–best can be obtained for all values of δ. As we explain in Section 4, the intuition for
this efficiency result is that the expert for treatment acts as a budget breaker, in a similar
way to the outside party in MacLeod (2003).
This paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the credence goods prob-
lem and our assumptions on observability and contracts. In Section 2 we characterise the
first–best decision. Section 3 analyses optimal contracts and establishes our main result. In
Section 4 we extend our model to a situation in which it is possible to separate diagnosis
and treatment. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
1 The Model
1.1 The Credence Good Problem
Consider the by now standard credence good problem. An expert potentially knows more
about the quality of a good or service that a consumer needs than the uninformed consumer
himself.19 In terms of the principal–agent literature, the consumer is the principal and the
expert the agent.
More precisely, the consumer needs one of two services (or treatments), depending on
his type. If the consumer has the minor problem θL, then the low-cost treatment TL is
sufficient. The problem might, however, be important, denoted by θH . In this case the high-
cost treatment TH is needed, as the low-cost service does not help. This formalises one type
of choice in health care that is often considered to lead to wasteful expenditures. Discussing
waste in health care, Fuchs (2009) gives the following example for a choice between a
high-cost procedure and a less expensive alternative: ‘high-cost drug-eluting stents may be
19See the survey by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).
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the better choice for some patients, but others would do just as well with less expensive
bare-metal stents’ (p. 2481). Formally, the consumer’s gross utility uP depends on his type
θ ∈ {θL,θH} and the treatment T ∈ {TL, TH} according to20
uP(θ , T ) =
(
0 if θ = θH and T = TL
v > 0 otherwise.
, (1)
We refer to the combination (θH , TL) as undertreatment: the consumer discovers ex post
that he has the major problem and that the service TL is insufficient. When the minor
problem is solved through the high-cost treatment in the combination (θL, TH), we speak of
overtreatment, as the low-cost service would have been sufficient.
The consumer is uncertain as to which service is the correct one. But he knows the prior
probability
Prob(θL) = 1− Prob(θH) = q. (2)
The outside option of the consumer is not to be treated at all, giving zero utility to both
consumer and expert.
Also the expert a priori only knows (2). But he can acquire additional information about
the consumer’s problem to identify the appropriate treatment. To do so he needs to exert
effort at a cost c ≥ 0, which enables him to privately observe a signal s ∈ {sL, sH} about the
consumer’s problem θ . The signal is correct with probability σ, i.e.
Prob(sL|θL) = Prob(sH |θH) = σ, Prob(sL|θH) = Prob(sH |θL) = 1−σ, (3)
with σ > 1/2. If the expert exerts no effort, he incurs no cost but learns nothing. These
assumptions generalise the previous literature on credence goods which assumed either
c = 0 or σ = 1 or both. The effort cost c can also be interpreted as the opportunity costs
of time. Physicians often complain that changes in reimbursement oblige them to see more
patients per day, thereby making it more difficult to conduct proper diagnosis.21
20The assumption that when the problem is important the low-cost treatment never solves it, while the
high-cost treatment solves it with probability one, is standard in the credence goods literature. It seems,
however, stronger than needed. Suppose the low–cost treatment has a small and the high–cost treatment a
high probability of solving the major problem respectively. Then it can be shown that our main result that the
first–best can be reached, provided delay costs are absent, is still true.
21See e.g. Sandeep Jauhar, ‘Busy Doctors, Wasteful Spending’, The New York Times 20, July 2014.
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Once the consumer was treated in the first period and experienced undertreatment, in
a second period he can request the high-cost treatment, which will then solve his problem.
We introduce the discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1], in order to capture that the consumer prefers
his problem to be solved in period 1 rather than in period 2. A special case is when δ = 0
and only one treatment can be applied. This might be because the treatment is urgent (the
consumer is extremely impatient) or the first treatment is irreversible. For simplicity we
assume that the consumer and the expert share a common discount factor.
Abusing notation we indicate also the treatment costs by TL and TH . Unless explicitly
stated otherwise, we assume that v > TH > TL ≥ 0, q ∈ (0,1), c > 0, δ > 0, and σ > 1/2.
The values of these parameters are common knowledge.
1.2 Observability and Contracts
We assume that the expert’s choice of treatment is observable. As mentioned in the Intro-
duction, this is likely to hold when no specific expertise is required to identify treatments.
Therefore, a contract can stipulate that he selects treatment TH for a payment pH in the first
period. Since it is commonly known that this solves the consumer’s problem, under this
contract the principal–agent relation ends at the end of the first period.
Also, a contract can specify that the expert selects treatment TL in the first period. We as-
sume, however, that success and failure are not publicly observable. The consumer privately
learns whether this treatment has been successful or not at the end of the first period. There-
fore, the payment for treatment TL can only depend on a subjective evaluation R ∈ {S, F} of
the consumer, where S indicates ‘success’ and F ‘failure’. Thus, if the expert selects treat-
ment TL, he receives the payment pLS if the consumer reports S and pLF otherwise. This
captures for example health problems for which it is difficult to measure treatment success
objectively. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) mention the difficulty of proving the absence
of pain as an example. It is less appropriate when an objective test exists, like in the case of
cancer screening.
Since v > TH , a contract optimally entitles the consumer to treatment TH in the second
period upon failure of treatment TL in the first period. Without loss of generality, there are
no additional payments for the second treatment. This means that the payment pLF is the
reimbursement for treatment TL in the first period and TH in the second period.
22 As the
22If the consumer has to pay p′LF for the first and p′2 for the second treatment, this is equivalent to a single
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consumer can misreport a successful treatment, for completeness we also have to specify
his utility for the case where he demands TH even though his problem has been solved by
TL in the first period. We assume that in this case a second treatment in period 2 does not
affect the consumer’s gross utility, i.e. his gross payoff remains v at the end of period 1.23
Finally, the consumer may wish the expert to exert diagnosis effort before a treatment is
selected. Yet, in addition to the problem that success and failure of the low–cost treatment
are not publicly observable, this creates a moral hazard problem: neither the public nor the
consumer observe whether the expert invests effort in information acquisition, and if so
which signal he observes. Therefore, if the consumer prefers a costly diagnosis, he has to
delegate the choice of treatment to the expert and to choose the payments
p ≡ (pH , pLS, pLF) (4)
in such a way that they provide the incentive to acquire information about θ . Indeed, under
an optimal contract, the Revelation Principle requires the expert to report the observed
signal truthfully and the consumer to commit himself to a treatment strategy contingent
on the expert’s report. In line with the Delegation Principle (see, e.g., Holmström, 1984;
Alonso and Matouschek, 2008) this is equivalent to a contract that delegates the choice of
treatment to the expert. Once the treatment decision is delegated to the expert, the client is
committed to undergo the treatment selected by the expert and he cannot reject a treatment
decision. This assumption is important because otherwise the client might want to leave
without payment after hearing the diagnosis and request the treatment from another expert
or remain untreated.
The contracting relation proceeds in the following stages:
1. Nature determines the consumer’s type θ ∈ {θL,θH}. Neither the consumer nor the
expert observes the realization of θ . They both know only the a priori probabilities as
given by (2).
payment pLF = p′LF +δp′2 after the first treatment.
23Constant gross utility is the conservative assumption to make, as if the consumer’s gross utility were to
decline, incentives for misreporting were reduced. On the other hand, increasing gross utility is not in line
with the basic assumptions of the credence goods problem, in which the high-cost treatment does not yield
higher gross utility than the low-cost treatment given that both solve the problem.
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2. The consumer signs a contract with the expert. This specifies some payments p. In
addition, the consumer can either delegate the choice of treatment to the expert or
he can demand some first–period treatment T ∈ {TL, TH}. Our assumptions ensure
that a positive net surplus can be achieved by an appropriate contract, on which both
parties will agree.
3. If the treatment is already specified in the contract, the expert selects the mandated
treatment. Otherwise, if the choice of treatment is delegated, he decides whether or
not to invest effort in information acquisition. After investing he privately observes a
signal s, updates his prior beliefs according to (3), and then chooses some first–period
treatment T . The expert’s effort decision is not observable. Without information ac-
quisition the expert directly selects T without observing a signal.
4. After a first–period treatment TH the contracting relation ends and the consumer pays
pH . If treatment TL has been selected, the consumer privately observes whether his
problem has been solved. If he reports ‘success’ he pays pLS and the relation ends; if
he reports ‘failure’ he pays pLF and receives treatment TH in the second period.
Thus, the consumer can either keep authority over the selection of treatment or he can
delegate the treatment decision to the expert. If he is confident that he can identify the
appropriate treatment, he can follow his judgement. Otherwise he has the opportunity of
letting the expert determine the treatment decision. This seems to be in line with patient
preferences. When the choice of the appropriate treatment is uncertain patients prefer to
delegate the final decision to their physician, rather than making the decision themselves.24
2 First–Best Treatment Strategies
Before analysing the optimal contract between the consumer and the expert, we consider
the first–best outcome. This analysis is closely related to the characterization of efficient
policies in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009).25 Suppose the consumer is able to acquire
24See Pauline W. Chen, M.D., ‘Letting Doctors Make the Tough Decisions’, The New York Times 11, August
2011.
25There are, however, subtle differences. On one hand, we consider a more general setting with delay costs
in which the expert’s signal might be noisy. On the other hand, Dulleck and Kerschbamer assume that the
consumer gets a per period utility.
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information and to perform the appropriate treatment with the same cost as the expert.
Since the consumer himself effectively takes over the role of the expert, both the problem
of subjective evaluation and the incentive problems of investing effort and revealing the
signal disappear. The consumer maximises the overall surplus and the result is the first–
best decision.
As explained before, when treatment TL fails in period 1, it is optimal to choose TH in
the second period. Therefore, the different combinations of treatments T and types θ imply
the surplus net of treatment cost given in Table 1.
θL θH
TL v − TL −TL +δ(v − TH)
TH v − TH v − TH
Table 1: Surplus Net of Treatment Cost
At the beginning of the first period the consumer can either choose the treatment based
on prior information only or he can invest in information before making his choice. Thus
there are three possible treatment strategies. First, the consumer can choose treatment TH
without acquiring information. This yields the net surplus
S∗H ≡ v − TH , (5)
because the treatment is always successful. Yet, with probability q it involves overtreatment.
Second, also based on prior information only, the consumer can first try the low-cost
treatment and correct this choice later when needed. We call this the trial-&-error strategy.
It yields the net surplus
S∗T&E ≡ q(v − TL) + (1− q) [−TL +δ(v − TH)] , (6)
because the problem is solved with the a priori probability q, whereas with probability 1−
q it turns out that TL results in undertreatment so that the high-cost treatment becomes
necessary in period 2. The trial-&-error strategy can be interpreted as risky experimentation,
because failure of the treatment in period 1 reveals that the consumer has the major problem
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θH . Thus the choice between TH and the trial-&-error strategy can be viewed as a problem
of deciding between a ‘safe’ and a ‘risky’ action.
Finally, if the consumer exerts effort in diagnosis he will choose treatment Ti upon ob-
serving signal si. With a binary signal and two treatments this choice is clearly optimal
because investing in information acquisition and then ignoring the information cannot be
optimal.26 Therefore, the expected surplus from spending the cost c on diagnosis is
S∗I ≡ q [σ(v − TL) + (1−σ)(v − TH)] (7)
+(1− q)[σ(v − TH) + (1−σ)(−TL +δ(v − TH))]− c.
Indeed, with probability q the problem is minor and overtreatment occurs only if the signal
is incorrect. With probability 1− q the problem is major, and when the signal is incorrect
the treatment decision must be corrected later. These expected benefits are reduced by the
information cost c.
From the payoffs in (5)–(7) we can now derive the first–best treatment strategy. If
treatment choice is based on prior information only, the trial-&-error strategy is at least as
good as choosing the high-cost treatment if S∗T&E ≥ S∗H , which is equivalent to
q ≥ q∗ ≡ (1−δ)(v − TH) + TL
(1−δ)(v − TH) + TH . (8)
Clearly, our assumptions imply that q∗ ∈ (0, 1). Intuitively, the trial-&-error strategy is the
more attractive, the more the consumer is concerned with overtreatment and the less he
cares about undertreatment and the riskiness of experimenting by trial-&-error.
Investing in information is optimal if it is at least as good as choosing any of the two
strategies based on prior information, i.e. if S∗I ≥ S∗H and S∗I ≥ S∗T&E. These two conditions
are satisfied if and only if
c ≤ cI(q) ≡ (TH − TL) [q(2σ− 1) + 1−σ] (9)
− (1−σ)(1− q) [v(1−δ) +δTH]
and
c ≤ cI I(q) ≡ (TH − TL) [q(2σ− 1)−σ] (10)
+σ(1− q) [v(1−δ) +δTH] .
26For a formal proof and discussion of this argument see Lemma 3 below.
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Therefore, as long as
c ≤ c¯(q)≡min[cI(q), cI I(q)], (11)









Fig. 1: First–best Treatment Strategies
It is easily verified, that cI(·) and cI I(·) are linear in q with ∂ cI(q)/∂ q > 0 and
∂ cI I(q)/∂ q < 0. Further, for q∗ as defined in (8) we have
c¯(q∗) = cI(q∗) = cI I(q∗) =
(2σ− 1)(TH − TL) [(1−δ)(v − TH) + TL]
v(1−δ) +δTH > 0. (12)
As illustrated in Figure 1, this implies that the critical level of information costs c¯(·) is linearly
increasing in q for q < q∗ and decreasing for q > q∗ so that c¯(·) is maximised by q∗. Moreover,
as c¯(q∗) > 0, by (11) information acquisition is the optimal strategy for some interval Q(c)
of q-values with q∗ in its interior whenever c ≤ c¯(q∗). As c decreases, Q(c) expands so that
information acquisition becomes attractive for a larger range of parameter combinations.
The following proposition summarises the first–best treatment strategy:
PROPOSITION 1. The first–best solution has the following properties:
(a) If c ≥ c¯(q) and q ≤ q∗, it is optimal to choose the high-cost treatment without diagnosis.
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(b) If c ≥ c¯(q) and q ≥ q∗, it is optimal to choose the trial-&-error strategy, i.e. the low-cost
treatment without diagnosis, followed by the high-cost treatment in case of failure.
(c) If c ≤ c¯(q), it is optimal to exert effort in diagnosis and choose the treatment contingent
on the information revealed.
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1. Information acquisition before choosing a treatment
constitutes the first–best strategy in the grey shaded area. Outside this area, the first–best
outcome requires the high–cost treatment if q ≤ q∗ and the trial-&-error strategy other-
wise. As can be seen from the shape of the grey shaded area, the more diffuse the prior, the
less is known about the success of treatments and the higher the incentives for diagnosis.
As the prior becomes more precise, the risk of overtreatment with the high-cost treatment
or of undertreatment with the trial-&-error strategy declines, because ∂ cI(q)/∂ q > 0 and
∂ cI I(q)/∂ q < 0 respectively. Indeed, when the prior becomes perfectly precise as q→ 0 or
q→ 1, the treatment decisions based on prior information entail no risk of over- or under-
treatment and information acquisition is not needed to take the correct treatment decision.
Moreover, the overall incentives to invest in information before choosing a treatment (mea-
sured e.g. by the altitude of the grey shaded triangle) are the higher, the more important it
is to avoid over- and undertreatment and the more precise the signal is that can be acquired.
Figure 1 also shows the trade–off between acquiring information by diagnosis versus
experimentation by trial-&-error: The latter is costly because with probability 1−q the cost
of treatment TL is wasted and the solution of the consumer’s problem is delayed. There-
fore, experimentation is more attractive than diagnosis only if the cost of diagnosis exceeds
cI I(q). In the limit TL → 0 and δ→ 1, however, q∗ → 0 and c¯(q∗)→ 0 because the cost of
experimentation tends to zero. In this limit, therefore, the first–best solution is always to
experiment by applying the trial-&-error strategy.
Before analysing optimal contracts under the informational assumptions of Section 1, it
may be useful to point out that despite the non–observability of diagnosis effort the first–best
treatment strategy can easily be implemented by a contract as long as success and failure
of a treatment are publicly observable. Payments then can be made directly contingent
on the treatment outcome: If already the first–period treatment is successful, the expert
receives the payment p = v−k in period 1; otherwise the first period payment is reduced to
p = δv − k and the expert is contractually obliged to administer the high-cost treatment in
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period 2. The parameter k is some constant that determines the division of expected surplus
between both parties.
With these payments, the expert’s expected profit net of expected treatment costs is S∗H−k
if he chooses the high cost treatment in period 1. If he adopts the trial-&-error strategy, he
gets S∗T&E − k; and if he invests in information before selecting the first–period treatment he
gets S∗I − k. Thus, by the above payments the expert becomes the residual claimant and he
will choose the treatment strategy that maximises the first–best surplus.
3 Optimal Contracts
We now study the optimal contract between the consumer and the expert. Since both parties
are risk–neutral, they agree at the contracting stage to maximise their joint surplus. To
derive the optimal contract, we can therefore focus on contracts that maximise the net
surplus. Under our assumptions a positive net surplus can be achieved by an appropriate
contract, on which both parties will agree. The actual division of surplus depends on market
conditions and can be determined by some upfront payments or by adjusting the payments p
in (4) appropriately.27 If, for example, there are several competing experts and the consumer
has all the bargaining power at the contracting stage, he can appropriate the entire joint net
surplus in this way.
We first investigate the possibility of implementing the first–best outcome through a
contract. Trivially, this is possible for all parameter combinations described in part (a) of
Proposition 1, where the first–best solution is to choose the high–cost treatment without
prior diagnosis. In this situation the expert can simply be contractually obliged to select
treatment TH for a payment pH . The consumer’s and the expert’s payoffs from such a con-
tract are
UH(p)≡ v − pH , VH(p)≡ pH − TH . (13)
The expert’s reimbursement can be set equal to pH = TH + k, where k is some constant that
27As our analysis below shows, incentive effects depend only on payment differences for different treat-
ments. Therefore, the level of payments can be adjusted to reflect market power. Our approach allows for
alternative interpretations. For example, a benevolent social planner proposing the contract would also aim
to maximise the joint net surplus but might wish to take into account some criterion of distributive justice
when dividing the surplus between the agents.
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can be adjusted to divide the joint surplus S∗H = UH(p) + VH(p) = v − TH . In the extreme
cases, if the consumer has all the bargaining power, k = 0 and the expert’s net payoff is
zero; if the expert has all the bargaining power, k = v−TH and so the consumer’s net payoff
is zero.
Next consider the case where the trial-&-error strategy is optimal in the first–best, i.e.
where part (b) of Proposition 1 applies. In this case contracting is slightly complicated by
the fact that the consumer privately observes success or failure of the first–period treatment.
Optimal contract design requires that he publicly reports his information (see Myerson,
1986). Further, by the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1979) there is no loss of generality in
considering only contracts under which reporting is truthful. The following lemma describes
the restrictions that the truthful reporting requirement imposes on the payments p:
LEMMA 1. The consumer reports success and failure truthfully after treatment TL if and only if
pLF −δv ≤ pLS ≤ pLF . (14)
PROOF: If treatment TL was successful, the consumer’s payoff from truthful reporting at the
end of period 1 is v − pLS. If he reports F , he gets v − pLF . Therefore, the second inequality
in (14) ensures that he reports truthfully. If the treatment TL failed, the consumer’s payoff
from reporting F is −pLF +δv and his payoff from reporting S is −pLS. By the first inequality
in (14), he therefore reports truthfully. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, reporting success must be cheaper for the consumer than reporting failure.
The difference, however, cannot be larger than the gains from receiving the high-cost treat-
ment in the second period. Given that the condition for truthful reporting in (14) holds, at
the contracting stage the consumer’s and the expert’s payoffs from the trial-&-error strategy
are
UT&E(p) ≡ q(v − pLS) + (1− q)(δv − pLF), (15)
VT&E(p) ≡ q(pLS − TL) + (1− q)(pLF − TL −δTH),
because with probability q the first–period treatment TL is successful and with probability
1 − q it fails, requiring the high-cost treatment in period 2. For any p satisfying (14), the
contracting parties can achieve the first–best joint surplus S∗T&E = UT&E(p) + VT&E(p).
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Obviously, it is not problematic to write a contract complying with the incentive–
compatibility constraint (14). Since the interval [pLF − δv, pLF] is non–empty, it is always
possible to choose a price pLS within this interval. In particular, consider a contract with
equal markup payments as in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) so that the expert’s net payoff
is independent of treatment costs. Such a contract is defined by the property that
pH − TH = pLS − TL = pLF − (TL +δTH) = k, (16)
for some markup k that can be adjusted to determine the division of the joint surplus. As
v > TH > 0, it is easy to see that these payments satisfy (14). With equal markups the
consumer fully bears the cost of an additional treatment, and therefore he always reports
truthfully.
The efficient choice between the safe treatment TH and risky experimentation by trial-
&-error can be implemented because treatments are observable. Unlike in Bergemann and
Hege (2005) and Hörner and Samuelson (2013), where the agent’s experimentation effort is
not observable, in our setting experimentation involves no problem of moral hazard. Since
the remaining problem of truthful subjective evaluation by the consumer is solvable by the
appropriate payments, we obtain the following conclusion:
PROPOSITION 2. Let c ≥ c¯(q), i.e. the first–best requires no investment in diagnosis. Then
there exists an optimal contract that implements the first–best solution.
We now turn to the more interesting and also more complicated case where the first–
best treatment strategy involves diagnosis effort by the expert, as in part (c) of Proposition
1. Implementing this strategy by a contract requires not only that the consumer truthfully
reports the outcome of the low–cost treatment, but also that the expert invests c in informa-
tion acquisition and reports his private information truthfully. Consider a contract satisfying
(14) so that the first of these requirements is fulfilled. Then, if the expert exerts effort and
chooses treatment Ti upon observing signal si, the expected payoffs of the consumer and
the expert are
UI(p) ≡ q [σ(v − pLS) + (1−σ)(v − pH)] (17)
+(1− q)[σ(v − pH) + (1−σ)(δv − pLF)],
VI(p) ≡ q [σ(pLS − TL) + (1−σ)(pH − TH)] (18)
+(1− q) [σ(pH − TH) + (1−σ)(pLF − TL −δTH)]− c,
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and their joint surplus is S∗I = UI(p) + VI(p).
When the expert receives the authority to select a treatment, he will exert diagnosis effort
only if this gives him a higher payoff than selecting a treatment based on prior information
only. Thus the contractual payments have to satisfy the effort incentive constraints
VI(p)≥ VH(p), VI(p)≥ VT&E(p). (19)
Actually, these constraints also imply that the expert will select treatment Ti after observing
signal si. This is so because with a binary signal and two treatments it cannot be optimal to
invest c > 0 in diagnosis and then to ignore the information.28 Condition (19) is equivalent
to requiring that p simultaneously solves
c ≤ cA(p, q) ≡ (TH − TL − pH) [q(2σ− 1) + 1−σ] (20)
− (1−σ)(1− q) (δTH − pLF) + qσpLS
and
c ≤ cB(p, q) ≡ (TH − TL − pH) [q(2σ− 1)−σ] (21)
+σ(1− q) (δTH − pLF)− q(1−σ)pLS.
Therefore, condition (19) can also be written as
c ≤ c˜(p, q)≡min[cA(p, q), cB(p, q)]. (22)
In what follows we say that a treatment with diagnosis effort is implementable by a
contract with payments p if these satisfy both the consumer’s truthful reporting requirement
(14) and the expert’s effort incentive constraint (19), or equivalently (22). The following
result characterises the parameter combinations under which such a contract is feasible.
PROPOSITION 3. There exist payments p that implement diagnosis effort by the expert if and
only if
c ≤ cˆ(q)≡ q(1− q)(2σ− 1)δTH . (23)
If this condition holds, then diagnosis effort is implementable in particular by the payments
pˆH = TH + k, pˆLS = pˆLF = TL + (1− q)δTH + k, (24)
for some constant k.
28For a formal proof and discussion of this argument see Lemma 3 below.
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PROOF: Let pˆ maximise c˜(p, q), as defined in (22), subject to the truthful reporting condition
(14). Then obviously, diagnosis effort is implementable if and only if c ≤ c˜(pˆ, q) = cˆ(q).
If cA(p, q)> cB(p, q) then c˜(p, q) = cB(p, q) is increasing in pH by (21) because q(2σ−1)−
σ < 0. If cA(p, q)< cB(p, q) then c˜(p, q) = cA(p, q) is decreasing in pH by (20) because q(2σ−
1)+1−σ > 0. Therefore, c˜(p, q) is maximised by pH if cA(pH , pLS, pLF , q) = cB(pH , pLS, pLF , q).
This yields
pˆH = TH [1−δ(1− q)]− TL + qpLS + (1− q)pLF . (25)
Since
c˜(pˆH , pLS, pLF , q) = q(1− q)(2σ− 1)(δTH + pLS − pLF), (26)
is increasing in pLS and decreasing in pLF , it is maximised subject to (14) by setting pˆLF =
pˆLS. As c˜(pˆH , pˆLS, pˆLF , q) = q(1− q)(2σ − 1)δTH , this proves (23). Finally, we obtain from
(25) for pˆLF = pˆLS that
pˆH − pˆLS = pˆH − pˆLF = TH [1−δ(1− q)]− TL, (27)
which is equivalent to (24). Q.E.D.
Since the consumer reports truthfully and because TL additionally requires TH with prob-
ability 1− q in the next period, the prices pˆ in (24) can be interpreted as equal markups on
the expected treatment costs of choosing TH or TL before receiving information.
29 This has
two implications. First, these payments make the consumer indifferent between reporting
success and failure after a successful low-cost treatment inducing hence truthful reporting,
as (14) holds. Second, they have the property that they equalise the expert’s payoffs from
treatment choices based on prior information alone, that is VT&E(pˆ) = VH(pˆ). Thus, once
the expert prefers information acquisition to one of the treatment choices based on prior
information, he also prefers it to the other. More precisely, compared to recommending the
high-cost treatment without diagnosis, information acquisition allows the expert to target
the low-cost treatment correctly with probability qσ and to gain (1− q)δTH . This gain rep-
resents the part of the payment for the low-cost treatment that covers the expected costs of
a possible second period treatment, which is not needed. With probability (1− q)(1−σ),
29We conjecture that equal markups on the expected costs of a treatment strategy provide optimal incentives
for costly diagnosis not only in our setting but also in more general environments. The reason is that with
such payments the expert will seek to minimise expected treatment costs.
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however, the low-cost treatment is incorrectly administered and the expert has to supply
the high-cost treatment in period 2. This implies a loss of qδTH , as he only receives the
expected costs of the second period treatment (1− q)δTH . Taking all together, information
acquisition is preferred whenever it is cheap enough so that (23) holds. For a given combi-
nation of q and c the prices pˆ are not necessarily the only ones that implement effort. But
they are chosen so that even for the highest cost c = cˆ(q) effort is implemented. In other
words, they maximise the range of parameter combinations for which effort is induced.
For δ = 0 the payments in (24) become the equal markup payments in (16). But in this
special case cˆ(q) = 0 and hence effort is only implemented when it is costless. This raises
the important question whether equal markup payments can implement effort for δ > 0. As
we have seen above, the payments in (16) give the consumer no incentive to misreport the
outcome of the low–cost treatment. Yet, as the following result shows, they fail to provide
incentives for the expert to invest in costly information.
PROPOSITION 4. Equal markup payments, as defined in (16), implement a treatment with
diagnosis effort if and only if information acquisition is costless, i.e. c = 0.
PROOF: Since equal markup prices satisfy the truthful reporting constraint, it remains to
check whether they satisfy the expert’s effort constraint. Inserting the prices in (16) into
(20) and (21) yields cA(p, q) = cB(p, q) = 0. Therefore, they satisfy (22) if and only if c = 0.
Q.E.D.
The intuition for why equal markups do not induce information acquisition is closely
related to their virtue in the standard model (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). In that
setting the diagnostic effort of the expert is costless and the only issue is to provide him with
the appropriate incentives to reveal his information. If markups are unequal and higher,
say, for the high-cost treatment, then the expert has an incentive to always recommend
this treatment, even if the low-cost treatment would have been sufficient. So the expert
has to be indifferent. But if he is indifferent gaining some markup k with each treatment,
then, by construction, both treatment choices based on prior information alone yield k and
information acquisition does not pay, because with such a strategy he also obtains k but has
to pay the cost of information c. The conclusion that equal markups prevent the expert from
exerting costly diagnosis effort remains valid also in more general settings than our binary
environment with two types of problems and two treatments: the idea is simply that if for
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any choice of treatment strategy the expert is reimbursed for the total cost of treatments
plus some constant markup, then his net payoff is the same for all treatment strategies.
Therefore, it is never optimal for him to spend diagnosis costs.30
Under our assumptions we have c˜(q) > 0 for all q ∈ (0,1). Therefore, for any q ∈ (0,1)
diagnosis effort is implementable if c is sufficiently small. Diagnostic effort is easier to
implement (or equivalently c˜ is the higher), the higher the precision of information σ, the
more diffuse the prior and the larger the scope for combined treatments as measured by
δ. While the first two are roughly in line with the first–best outcome, the latter plays an
important role. On one hand, we already mentioned that the extreme case of δ = 0 implies
cˆ(q) = 0 so that effort is only implementable when it is costless. On the other hand, as we
will see next, the other extreme of δ = 1 yields an efficiency result.
PROPOSITION 5. If and only if δ = 1, diagnosis effort can be contractually implemented for all
parameter combinations for which it is optimal in the first–best. That is,
{c, q|c ≤ c¯(q)} ⊆ {c, q|c ≤ cˆ(q)}
if and only if δ = 1.
PROOF: From (8), (12) and (23) we obtain that
cˆ(q∗)− c¯(q∗) = −(1−δ)(2σ− 1)v(TH − TL) [(1−δ)(v − TH) + TL]
[v(1−δ) +δTH]2 . (28)
Further, by (9,(10), and (23) we have
cˆ(0)− c¯(0) = cˆ(0)− cI(0) = (1−σ) [(1−δ)(v − TH) + TL]≥ 0, (29)
cˆ(1)− c¯(1) = cˆ(1)− cI I(1) = (1−σ)(TH − TL)≥ 0. (30)
Recall that c¯(·) is linearly increasing in q for q < q∗ and linearly decreasing for q > q∗ and is
thus maximised by q∗. The function cˆ(·) is strictly concave. For δ = 1, we have cˆ(q∗) = c¯(q∗).
This together with (29) and (30) implies that cˆ(q) ≥ c¯(q) for all q ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, for
δ = 1 the first–best can be implemented by Proposition 3, whenever diagnosis effort is
optimal in the first–best.
30The argument is the same as in the standard moral hazard model à la Holmström (1979) that the agent
will exert no effort if his wage is constant and does not depend on his output.
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For δ < 1, by (28) we have cˆ(q∗) < c¯(q∗). This implies that cˆ(q) < c¯(q) for some values
of q sufficiently close to q∗ and so diagnosis effort cannot be contractually implemented if








Fig. 2: Non–implementability of First–best
The set of parameter combinations for which the first–best requires a treatment based
on information acquisition, but this is not implementable by a contract, is equal to
Z ≡ {c, q|cˆ(q)< c < c¯(q)} . (31)
By Proposition 5, this set is non–empty if and only if δ < 1. In Figure 2 the set Z is depicted
for this case by the grey shaded area. For a parameter combination in Z only a second–
best solution without diagnosis effort can be obtained by the contracting parties. From our
previous analysis it follows that the optimal contract then has the following properties:
PROPOSITION 6. Let (c, q) ∈ Z . Then contractually implementing the high-cost treatment with-
out diagnosis is optimal if q ≤ q∗, and implementing the trial-&-error strategy without diagnosis
is optimal if q ≥ q∗.
In comparison with the first–best, the second–best solution involves a higher likelihood
of overtreatment for the high-cost treatment, and of undertreatment for the the trial-&-
error strategy. More precisely, the following efficiency losses arise for q ≤ q∗ and q > q∗,
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respectively:
S∗I − S∗H = qσ(TH − TL)− (1− q)(1−σ)[(1−δ)(v − TH) + TL]− c, (32)
S∗I − S∗T&E = (1− q)σ[(1−δ)(v − TH) + TL]− q(1−σ)(TH − TL)− c.
In both expressions, the first term indicates the gain from more precise information, allowing
to avoid overtreatment and undertreatment, respectively. The second term arises from the
fact that the signal is sometimes incorrect and following it leads to undertreatment and
overtreatment, respectively. Lastly, the diagnosis cost has to be taken into account.
4 Separation of Diagnosis and Treatment
Our analysis in the previous sections implicitly assumes that a single expert is responsible for
both diagnosis and treatment. We now show that the first–best outcome can be obtained
if separating diagnosis and treatment is feasible. As we indicate in the Introduction, this
is possible in situations where diagnosis and treatment are essentially independent proce-
dures with small economies of scope. To simplify our analysis, in this section we completely
abstract from any kind of interdependencies or economies of scope.31
Suppose the consumer contracts with two different experts, a and b, for diagnosis and
treatment. Expert a is an expert for diagnosis and can acquire information about the con-
sumer’s problem by investing the effort cost c; expert b incurs the cost T for providing
treatment T . After a diagnosis, expert a prescribes a treatment which is then executed by
expert b. Otherwise, the sequence of events and the assumptions on observability are the
same as explained in Section 1. A contract specifies the payments
pa ≡ (paH , paLS, paLF), pb ≡ (pbH , pbLS, pbLF) (33)
each expert receives, contingent on the first period treatment and the consumer’s report
about the outcome in case of treatment TL. As before, when the consumer reports failure of
treatment TL, the payment p
b
LF includes expert b’s compensation for the additional treatment
TH in the second period. In total the consumer now has to pay
pH ≡ paH + pbH , pLS ≡ paLS + pbLS, pLF ≡ paLF + pbLF . (34)
31We also assume that the two experts are prevented from colluding on information revelation and treatment
choice by exchanging side payments. Indeed, if side contracting cannot be detected, the experts can evade
separation and will act as under joint provision.
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To ensure that he reports success and failure of the low–cost treatment truthfully, his total
payments have to satisfy condition (14).
After investing the diagnosis cost c and observing a signal s ∈ {sL, sH}, expert a’s posterior
belief that the consumer has the minor problem θL is equal to
piL ≡ Prob(θL|sL) = 1− Prob(θH |sL) = σq
σq + (1−σ)(1− q) , (35)
piH ≡ Prob(θL|sH) = 1− Prob(θH |sH) = (1−σ)q(1−σ)q +σ(1− q) ,
for signal sL and sH , respectively. Note that piL > piH as σ > 1/2. A contract optimally
delegates the choice of treatment to the diagnosis expert a. Thus, after the diagnosis expert
a informs expert b about the appropriate treatment.
Since the information obtained by diagnosis effort is not publicly observable, under an
optimal contract expert a should truthfully reveal the appropriate treatment that expert b
has to execute. The following lemma characterises the payments pa that make prescribing
the appropriate treatment incentive compatible for expert a:
LEMMA 2. Let (14) hold so that the consumer reports success and failure truthfully after treat-




LS + (1−piH) paLF ≤ paH ≤ piL paLS + (1−piL) paLF . (36)
PROOF: If expert a selects treatment TH after observing signal s, his payoff is simply p
a
H
because this treatment always succeeds. If instead he chooses TL, his expected payoff after
observing signal si ispii p
a
LS+(1−pii) paLF , because the posterior probability of failure is 1−pii.
Therefore, the first inequality in (36) ensures that choosing TH after sH is optimal, and the
second inequality that TL is optimal after sL. Q.E.D.
Intuitively, the expected payments from prescribing the low-cost treatment must be
lower than the payments for the high-cost treatment when expert a believes that the latter
is appropriate, and higher when he thinks the low-cost treatment is correct.
Finally, since expert a is employed as diagnosis expert, the contract has to ensure that
he invests the information cost c. By doing so he receives the ex ante expected payoff
V aI (p
a)≡ q σpaLS + (1−σ)paH+ (1− q) σpaH + (1−σ)paLF− c. (37)
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Note that the difference with VI(·) in (18) is that expert a does not incur any treatment costs,
because now expert b performs the treatment. When not investing in diagnosis, expert a
can either get the payoff V aH (p
a) by prescribing TH or V aT&E(p
a) by the trial-&-error strategy,
where
V aH (p
a)≡ paH , V aT&E(pa)≡ qpaLS + (1− q)paLF . (38)
Thus, the effort incentive constraint
V aI (p
a)≥ V aH (pa), V aI (pa)≥ V aT&E(pa) (39)
implements diagnosis effort by expert a.
As the choice of treatment is verifiable, expert b can be contractually obliged to provide
the treatment prescribed by expert a. Therefore, there are no further incentive problems and
a treatment based on diagnosis effort is implemented by the payments (pa, pb) whenever
the constraints (14), (36), and (39) are satisfied. Actually, in what follows we can ignore
constraint (36) because the following lemma shows that it is redundant.
LEMMA 3. Let the effort incentive constraint (39) hold. Then also the treatment incentive
constraint (36) is satisfied.
PROOF: Solving the inequality V aI (p
a)≥ V aH (pa) for paH yields
paH ≤ piL paLS + (1−piL)paLF −piL cσq . (40)
Since c ≥ 0, this implies that the second inequality in (36) holds. Solving the inequality
V aI (p
a)≥ V aT&E(pa) for paH yields
paH ≥ piH paLS + (1−piH)paLF +piH c(1−σ)q . (41)
Since c ≥ 0, this implies that the first inequality in (36) holds. This proves that (39) implies
(36). Q.E.D.
The first inequality in (39) keeps expert a from prescribing treatment TH without prior
diagnosis. This immediately implies that expert a will prescribe TL after his diagnosis re-
veals signal sL, because investing in costly diagnosis and then prescribing TH independently
of the signal cannot be optimal. Similarly, the second inequality in (39) ensures that ex-
pert a prescribes TH only after observing signal sH . Thus, in our binary setting with two
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treatments and two signals the expert’s effort constraint (39) keeps him from making fraud-
ulent prescriptions. This simplifies our analysis because we can ignore the truth-telling
constraints (36). In a more general framework with more than two signals and treatments
this simplification may not apply because the expert may want to invest in costly diagnosis
but make honest prescriptions for some signals and lie for others. In such a framework the
truth-telling constraints would impose additional restrictions on payments and cannot be
ignored.32
By Lemma 3, finding payments so that (14) and (39) hold is sufficient to prove that a
treatment based on information acquisition can be implemented. The following proposition
shows that this is possible whenever this treatment strategy is first–best.
PROPOSITION 7. Suppose a treatment based on information acquisition is optimal in the first–
best, i.e. c ≤ c¯(q). Then the first–best outcome can be contractually implemented by separating
diagnosis and treatment with the payments for diagnosis
paH = v − TH + ka, paLS = v − TL + ka, paLF = δ(v − TH)− TL + ka, (42)
to expert a, and for treatment
pbH = TH + k
b, pbLS = TL + k
b, pbLF = TL +δTH + (1−δ)v + kb (43)
to expert b, where ka and kb are some constants.
PROOF: From the definition of the first–best surplus of the different treatment strategies in
(5), (6), and (7) it immediately follows that expert a’s payoff in (37) and (38) satisfies
V aH (p
a) = S∗H + k
a, V aT&E(p
a) = S∗T&E + k
a, V aI (p
a) = S∗I + k
a. (44)
under the payments in (42). Therefore, whenever exerting diagnosis effort is optimal in the
first–best because S∗I ≥ max[S∗H , S∗T&E], then also expert a’s effort incentive constraint (39)
is fulfilled.
32Indeed, consider a setting with n treatments Ti and n signals si such that after signal si the expert should
prescribe treatment Ti . Then the effort incentive constraints for diagnosis would consist of n inequalities to
keep the expert from prescribing one of the n treatments without prior diagnosis. At the same time, there
would be n(n− 1) truth-telling constraints to induce the expert after each signal si to prescribe treatment Ti
rather than one of the other n−1 treatments. Thus for n> 2 there would be more truth-telling constraints than
effort incentive constraints. This means that for n > 2 one cannot expect that effort incentives are sufficient
to induce truth-telling.
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The consumer’s payments in (42) and (43) to both experts sum up to
pH = pLS = pLF = v + k
a + kb. (45)
Therefore, (14) is satisfied. Q.E.D.
With the payments specified in Proposition 7 the three parties together obtain the joint
surplus S∗I , as in the first–best. At the contracting stage this surplus can be split in an arbitrary
way by adjusting the constants ka and kb according to market conditions or the parties’
bargaining power.
The intuition for the efficiency result is that there are no incentive problems on the part of
expert b, because he is contractually obliged to provide the required treatment. On the one
hand, this allows adjusting the consumer’s total payments to both experts so that he reports
success and failure honestly. On the other hand, expert a can now be made the residual
claimant by payments that align his payoffs with the first–best surplus. Since this expert
seeks to maximise the first–best surplus, he has the correct incentives for diagnosis and
truthful reporting. This insight should extend beyond our binary framework with two signals
and treatments: The basic idea is that by separation the problem of subjective evaluation
can be circumvented. Therefore, payments become flexible to make the diagnosis expert
the residual claimant, whose diagnosis and reporting behaviour implements the first–best.
Is separation of diagnosis and treatment required for this construction? To answer this
question consider the framework of Section 3 with a single expert and suppose that the
expert is paid following (45), that is pH = pLS = pLF . Clearly, the consumer has no incentive
to misreport, as (14) is satisfied. Further, the critical cost levels in (20) and (21) can be
rewritten as
cA(p, q) = cI(q) + (1−σ)(1− q)(1−δ)v (46)
and
cB(p, q) = cI I(q)−σ(1− q)(1−δ)v. (47)
It is easy to see that if δ = 1, these payments establish the correct effort incentives for im-
plementing diagnosis.33 When δ < 1, however, it is no longer true that cA(p, q) = cI(q) and
cB(p, q) = cI I(q), implying that the effort incentive constraint is distorted. In contrast, sepa-
ration allows to preserve the correct incentives for expert a and the consumer by payments
33Note that, as stated above, the payments in Proposition 5 are not unique.
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that increase expert b’s net payoff by an amount of (1−δ)v whenever the consumer reports
failure.
Indeed, the payments to expert b serve to provide the correct incentives for the consumer
and expert a, rather than establishing incentives for expert b. This resembles results in the
literature on subjective evaluation: As MacLeod (2003) shows in a setting with a principal
and a single agent, wasteful payments to a third party are required to provide incentives for
the agent to exert effort and for the principal to truthfully reveal his subjective evaluation.
Such payments allow punishing the agent for poor performance without giving the principal
incentives for unjustified punishments. In our setting with two experts, expert b effectively
plays the role of a third party, which acts as a budget breaker. But, the payments to him
are not wasteful because they remain part of the overall surplus. This feature is similar
to the use of ‘bonus pools’ in Rajan and Reichelstein (2006): In a principal–agent relation
with multiple agents, an outside budget breaker is not needed because one can penalise one
agent by redistributing payments to other agents.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have studied a credence good problem in which a consumer relies on the advice of an
expert in order to choose one of two services. In our model payments must be designed
in order to solve a two-sided incentive problem. On one hand, costly diagnostic effort and
the diagnosis outcome are not observable. This creates incentive problems both for the ex-
pert’s choice of diagnostic effort and for his treatment recommendation. On the other hand,
treatment success is not publicly observable and payments must depend on the subjective
evaluation of the consumer. We find that payments with equal markups on the expected
treatment costs before receiving information can implement the first–best for some range
of parameter combinations. This range increases when the discount factor increases and
includes all parameter combinations when the discount factor is one.
Our model assumes that treatments are vertically differentiated, because the high-cost
treatment is equally effective as the low-cost treatment when the consumer’s problem is
minor but more effective when the problem is major. The main conclusions of our analysis,
however, remain valid also for horizontally differentiated treatments. In particular, it can
be shown that the first–best solution can always be contractually implemented if and only if
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the parties’ common discount factor is one. Moreover, payments with equal markups on the
expected treatment costs before receiving information are optimal in order to implement
diagnosis effort.34
We also show that the first–best is always attainable under the assumption that diagnosis
and treatment can be separated at no additional cost. Of course, separation may be ineffi-
cient and more costly than joint provision. There could be economies of scope in provision
of diagnosis and treatment or there could be costs reflecting the consumer’s time lost by
consulting several experts.35 In such a situation our analysis indicates that, if the discount
factor is less than one, there a is a trade-off between diagnosis effort incentives and the
additional cost of separation. As the discount factor decreases, separation becomes more
attractive, because the set of parameter combinations for which under combined provision
the first–best can be reached shrinks.
Our model generalises the information technology of the expert that the literature on
credence goods usually considers. Further generalizations of that technology are likely to
make it more difficult to implement the first–best when the expert provides both diagnosis
and treatment. However, our efficiency result when separation of both activities is possible
is likely to persist. The basic forces in our model are hence likely to be robust. Consider
for instance a setting in which the expert chooses the precision of the signal and the cost of
the signal is an increasing and convex function of its quality. The first–best requires that the
marginal benefit of higher precision equals marginal cost and adds an additional constraint
that optimal contracts must fulfill. This may make it more difficult to obtain the first–best
under joint provision of diagnosis and treatment. When separation is possible, however,
the expert’s payments under the optimal contract differ from the first–best surplus by an
additive constant, and set therefore the right incentives.
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Fig. 2. Non–implementability of First–best
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